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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
SOME PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
by Philip B. Kurland*
Before I begin to discuss the problems of construction that I see in the
Equal Rights Amendment proposed to the Ninety-first Congress, I think it
appropriate to reveal some of my conscious prejudices, so that the reader
may discount my bias in evaluating my arguments. First is my notion of
the proper function of constitutional amendments. I think that they are
clearly the best-and should be the exclusive-means of bringing about
changes in governmental structure. I think that they also offer an
appropriate means for reversal of constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court. I think that they may be the necessary means for protecting
minorities from being imposed on by the majority and for protecting the
unenfranchised against imposition by the enfranchised. Women, however,
are neither a minority nor unenfranchised. This suggests to me that the
most appropriate means for bringing about the desired changes would be
by appropriate legislation rather than constitutional amendment.
Second, I am convinced that women in this country suffer. from
unreasoned discrimination against them in many phases of their lives, not
least in the sphere of employment. But I am also of the view that this
unjustified discrimination does not derive primarily from governmental
action, except insofar as the government, as employer, behaves like other
employers.'
*Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago.
Much of the data on which I rely was compiled by Peter H. Fritts, Esq., when he was
a student in my seminar on the legislative process in 1966. He is, of course, not

responsible for the use to which I put the contents of his seminar paper here. His
paper is available in The University of Chicago Law School's Library. I am grateful to
him.1
See note 26 infra.
For those who believe that personal factors are also relevant in determining bias, I
would add some biographical data. I am a male. I am married. I have never been
divorced. My wife is a professional who is temporarily, probably, by personal
predilection, surely, devoting full time to housekeeping and child raising. We have
three lovely children, all girls. My job is certainly one that could be filled by a female
no less adequately than by a male. I belong to no organization that discriminates on
the basis of race, creed, sex, or national origin. I have no religious beliefs that direct
my attitude to discrimination on the basis of sex. But I do have a Jewish mother. I
find humor in Thurber's War between the Sexes. I do not subscribe to, but I do read
and look at, from time to time, Playboy magazine.
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I. SOME LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Forty-seven years after it was first proposed in Congress,2 originally
sponsored by those who had successfully waged the battle for the women's
suffrage amendment,3 a joint resolution to initiate an "equal rights
amendment"' was sprung from the tight grasp of Representative Celler,
chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
rushed through the House after a debate of less than one hour,' and failed
of endorsement in the Senate by a whisker. The 1923 version was put
simply and ambiguously: "Men and women shall have equal rights
throughout the United States and in every place subject to its jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." Obviously, this language was rife with problems of
appropriate construction. The 1970 language, in essentially the same form
that had been used for the last fifteen years or so, afforded different, but
no less challenging ambiguities. It read: "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex. Congress and the several States shall have power, within
their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
The proposal for an "equal rights" amendment obviously had not lain
dormant between 1923 and 1970. After the initial impetus provided by
the suffragettes, it had emerged again in the period following the Second
World War, during which much of what had theretofore been considered
"men's work" had been ably performed by women. Indeed, in the years
1942, 1943, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1956, and 1962, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary had reported favorably on essentially the
same proposal as that under consideration in 1970.6 And, in 1950 and
1953, the Senate had approved those resolutions with votes of 63 to 19
2

H.R.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923).
3Cf, e.g., the statement of Miss Mabel Vernon, Executive Secretary of the
National Woman's Party, before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives: "... as we were working for the national suffrage amendment ...
it

was borne very emphatically in upon us that we were not thereby going to gain full
equality for the women of this country, but that we were merely taking a step, but a
very important step, it seemed to us, toward the gaining of this equality." Hearings
on H.R.J. Res. 75 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,68th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1925).
4
H.R.J. Res. 264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
5
The vote was 350 to 1S, 116 CONG. REC. H7984 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
6S.J. Res. 8, S. REP. No. 1321, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) [Apparently the
Report was never actually written. See 88 CONG. REC. 4033 (1942) (remarks of
Senator Hughes)]; S.J. Res. 25, S.REP. No. 267, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); SJ.
Res. 61, S.REP. No. 1013, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) [This resolution received a
majority but not a two-thirds vote in the Senate, 52 CONG. REC. 9405 (1946)] ; SJ.
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and 73 to 11 respectively. 7 There was, therefore, some irony in the fact
that the proposal that had in the past succeeded in the Senate but
languished in the House of Representatives should, in 1970, have met its
doom in the upper house after passage in "the other body."
There is an explanation for this. The Senate had not changed its
position in the interim. The two successful Senate forays, in 1950 and
1953, had been accomplished only after the proposal had been amended
by Senator Hayden's language, which appended the following: "The
provisions of this article shall not be construed to impair any rights,
benefits or exemptions conferred by law upon persons of the female
sex."' Had the proponents of the 1970 proposal taken cognizance of this
history and accepted the conditions of the Hayden qualifications, I
venture that the proposal would have again readily secured Senate
acquiescence. The refusal by some protagonists to accept the qualification
was probably not, however, inadvertent; it was calculated. 9 It represented
a deliberate choice between two different objectives, either but not both
of which the proposed amendment might fully serve.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to
supply an inadequacy, to effectuate a change of policy, to formulate
a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like
nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as
read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is
what the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to be led
off the trail by tests that have overtones of subjective design. 1 0
Res. 76, S. REP. No. 1208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); S.J. Res. 25, S. REP. No.
137, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S.J. Res. 3, S. REP. No. 356, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951); S.J. Res. 49, S. REP. No. 221, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); SJ. Res. 39, S.

REP. No. 1991, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); S.J. Res. 142, S. REP. No. 2192, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

796 CONG. REC. 872 (1950); 99 CONG. REC. 8974 (1953).

896 CONG. REC. 870 (1950); 99 CONG. REC. 8973-74 (1953).
9
See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. E5452, E5454 (daily ed. June 10, 1970)
(Memorandum in support of the amendment by Marguerite Rawalt); 116 CONG.
REC. E2588, E2589 (daily ed. March 26, 1970) (Memorandum by the Citizens'

Advisory Council on the Status of Women). Both memoranda were inserted into the
Congressional Record by the amendment's sponsor, Representative Martha W.
Griffiths of Michigan.
1
Frankfurter, The Reading of Statutes, in OF LAW AND MEN 60 (Elman ed.

1956).
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If it is the duty of the judiciary to effectuate the aim of legislation, it is
no less the duty of the legislature, to the best of its capacity, to make clear
what its aims are. It ought to say what mischief it wishes to obviate, what
inadequacy it wants to supply, what change of policy it desires to
effectuate, or what plan of government it seeks to formulate. If it is an act
of usurpation for the judiciary to read legislation to effect its own aims
and purposes, it is an act of abdication for the legislature to fail to state its
purposes and aims in framing the legislative act that it promulgates.
The prime difficulty with the proposed "equal rights" amendment was
that the national legislature came close to approval of constitutional
legislation without defining-without knowing?-its aims and purposes.
This is not a lawyer's cavil. It was a defect so patent that 1newspaper
1
editorial writers could see it. Thus, the New York Times wrote:
Equal rights for women is a proposition so unarguable in principle
and so long overdue in practice that it is a.pity to have it approached
by the House of Representatives as an exercise in political
opportunism. For 47 years that body regularly rejected out of hand
all proposals for a women's rights amendment to the Constitution.
Now it approves, without committee hearings and after only an
hour's debate, a constitutional change of almost mischievous
ambiguity.
The 7'mes itself was guilty of "confounding the confusion," for it fell
into the trap of thinking that "equal rights" and "women's rights" are
necessarily descriptive of the same legislative objectives. As discussed
below, it is of the essence of the problem that frequently they are not.
Thus, there is merit in the Times' desire for elimination of "almost
mischievous ambiguity," just as there is merit in the editorial proposal of
the Wall Street Journal: "Well, we're all for the ladies, but even so, before
we write some new words into the Constitution it'd be nice to know what
they really do mean."I 2

A. A Basic Conflict ofPurpose
The primary problem of construction offered by the proposed "equal
rights" amendment derives from the fact that the movement for "women's
rights" is Janus-faced. The proposed amendment presented one aspect,
while much of its support was voiced in terms of its other visage. The first
would command the treatment of men and women as if there were no
1'N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 40, col. 1.
12Wall Street Journal, Aug. 13, 1970, at 6. col. 1.
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differences between them, even at the price of removing protections and
benefits that have otherwise been afforded to females. It was a demand for
legal "unisex" by constitutional mandate. And much of the benefit of
such a proposal, to the extent it was possible to effectuate it, would inure
to males rather than females, since equality may be attained by applying
to all the rules that had theretofore been applied only to females, such as a
lower age of emancipation, no legal obligation of family support, and
exemption from military service.
The second attitude towards "women's rights" would seek only the
elimination of discrimination against women, a ban on treating females as
a disabled class. Legislation purporting to afford-and in fact
affording-privileges to women that were not also available to men would
not run afoul of such constitutional provision. But disabilities legally
imposed on women because of their sex, such as denial of equal education
or employment opportunities, would be invalidated because grounded in a
suspect or invidious classification.
The difference between the two is essentially the difference between
the amendment without the qualifying Hayden language and with it. And
herein lies the conflict among those who would support some
constitutional change to abate the legal incapacities of women, certainly a
sufficient majority of both the House and the Senate to promulgate an
amendment, if they could but agree on its purpose and function.
There are some basic difficulties with the "unisex" approach, not the
least of which is that there are physiological and biological differences
between men and women that are not subject to eradication even by
constitutional amendment. Practically, of course, this may present no
difficulties because nature cannot be subjected to human laws, while
humans must bow to the laws of nature. The essential claim for such a
declaration of "equality of the sexes" is its symbolic value. The temper of
our times demands instant and simplistic answers to complex problems,
and it is this temper that assumes that the cure for such problems lies in
the incantation of the word "equality" by our highest governmental
means, the Constitution, or by the voice of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court of the United States. Without denying the importance of symbols, it
is necessary to recognize that when they are only the creatures of the
Constitution their effect, thus far at least, has been less than pervasive.
A second difficulty with a constitutional mandate of instant equality of
the sexes is that proferred by history. Times have changed in such a way
that it may well be possible for the generation of women now coming to
maturity to surrender all special legal protection and privileges. A great
majority of them have had all the opportunities for education and training
afforded their male peers, with an expectation of full opportunity to put
that education and training to the same use. They may well be able to
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succeed in a competitive society in which all differences in legal rights
between men and women are eradicated. There remains, however, a very
large part of the female population on whom the imposition of such a
constitutional standard could be disastrous. There is no doubt that society
permitted these women to come to maturity not as competitors with
males but rather as the bearers and raisers of their children and the keepers
of their homes. A multitude of women still find fulfillment in this role.
This may be unfortunate in the eyes of some; but it remains a fact. It can
boast no label of equality now to treat the older generations as if they
were their own children or grandchildren. Nor can women be regarded as
unified in their desire for this change. Certainly the desire to open
opportunities to some of them can be achieved without the price of
removing the protection of others.
On the other hand, there are also difficulties in an amendment that
does not ban all legislative distinctions in treatment of men and women,
which would leave unchallenged laws that purported to confer, in Senator
Hayden's language, "rights, benefits or exemptions ...upon persons of
the female sex." Deciding when a statute confers a benefit rather than
imposing a disability is often difficult. The most cited example are those
laws which provide for minimum wages, maximum hours, limitations on
night work, and requirements of sanitary conditions for women workers.
Certainly since Louis D. Brandeis fought for the validity of such
legislation, 1 3 it has been assumed by "right-thinking people" that the
legislation was for the benefit of women. Classical economists, on the
other hand, believe that such laws put women at a competitive
disadvantage in the employment market. An early Department of Labor
study, however, purported to show that there was no difference in
women's employment between those states that had laws providing
minimum wages, or banning night work, and those that did not, and only a
very small difference between the states that banned women's overtime
work and those that did not.' 4 This sort of question, whether the
legislation affords privilege or imposes disability, however, may be one
appropriate for judicial resolution on a case by case basis, with the results
dependent on the facts adduced and the values assigned to them.
Unfortunately, the proposed amendment and its legislative history offer
little guidance to a court attempting to resolve these difficult issues.
13See A.T. Mason, BRANDEIS 245-53 (1946).
14

See Hearing on SJ. Res. 61 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1945).
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B. The Problem of Equality
If an amendment were passed that in effect prohibited all legislative
classification in terms of sex, the results might not be desirable but the
problems of construction would be minimal. The judicial answers could be
mechanical and, therefore, easy. The difficulty is that not even the
sponsors of such a "unisex" amendment have made the claim for rigid
classification. Apparently embarrassed by the prospect of the abolition of
such existent requirements as separate toilet facilities for men and women
or the availability of "maternity leaves," proponents of the "equal rights"
amendment asserted that certain distinctions could continue to be
maintained, so long as the principle of equality is assured. 5 The concept
of equality is not, however, one that is easily defined or confined. 6
The phrase "equal rights" might be repeated an infinite number of
times without providing additional guidance to the speaker or listener. Mr.
Justice Cardozo noted some time ago that "a great principle of
constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an
adjective."' 7 And it was almost a century ago that Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen asserted that "equality is a word so wide and vague as to be by
itself almost unmeaning."' 8 Nothing that has happened in the intervening
years has made it more specific.
There are suggestions in some of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions to
mark the perimeter of a constitutional notion of equality that have an
appeal, if only to a small audience. In Whitney v. Tax Commission,1 9 he
pointed out that: "The Equal Protection Clause was not designed to
compel uniformity in the face of difference." And, in the same Term of
Court, he announced in 7gner v. Texas,2 0 "The constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated by the
law as though they were the same." Applying this notion in the context of
the "equal rights" amendment, one might work out some generalizations.
Governmental distinction between males and females would have to be
justified in fact before it could pass muster under the proposed
amendment. If the distinction were based on reason, the legislation should
be presumptively valid. The mere fact that there are two sexes should not
5

See 116 CONG. REC. E2588, E2891 (daily ed. March 26, 1970)(memorandum
of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women).
16See, e.g., P.B. Kurland, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT ch. 4 (1970).
17 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936).
1 8J.F. Stephen, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY 201 (1873).
'9309 U.S. 530, 542 (1940).
1

20310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). The Justice was also of the view that "there is no

greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals." Dennis v. United States,

339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950).
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be reason in itself for distinguishing between them in legislation. On the
other hand, the mere fact that a distinction was drawn between them
ought not suffice to invalidate the law. I should think, therefore, that
appropriate data of sociological conditions, especially those deriving from
a history of different treatment of the sexes, might warrant the
continuance of certain benefits and protections. This should certainly be
true of laws relating to domestic relations, where marriage contracts were
made under laws creating certain expectations of the obligations of one
spouse to the other, including the male's duty to support both his wife and
his children.

C. The Equal ProtectionClause
Such a construction necessarily raises the question whether the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendm6nt does not already afford all
that the proposed "equal rights" amendment would offer. The difficulty is
that the only informed answer must be that it probably does, but we have
no definitive construction by the Supreme Court to give us adequate
assurance. Certainly some cases in the past raise doubts that the notion of
nondiscrimination on the ground of sex has yet been established.
Breedlove v. Suttles,2" Goesaert v. Cleary,2 2 and Hoyt v. Florida,2 3 to
the extent that they remain viable precedents, do not make it clear that
classification by sex is regarded, under the fourteenth amendment, as a
"suspect classification" like race or religion.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the fourteenth
amendment and the commerce clause give the national legislature more
than adequate authority to ban discrimination on the basis of sex. And the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 affords ample evidence that the power will be
utilized where the legislature finds that such invidious discrimination needs
24
extirpation.
If, as is likely, the laws of biology and judicial construction blunt the
extreme effects of the "unisex" concept, and the amendment, if adopted,
is interpreted in a fashion similar to the fourteenth, the "equal rights"
amendment will become more important for its enabling clause than its
direct substantive effect. As proposed, it adds little to what is already
provided by the fourteenth amendment together with the commerce
clause. Nor does the proposal resolve the ambiguities that inhere in a direct
21302 U.S. 277 (1937).
22335 U.S. 464 (1948).
23368 U.S. 57 (1961).

24

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964). See Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971).
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restraint on governmental action: To what extent is the constitutional ban
to be read as one against state action only? When is individual action to be
treated as state action? And to what degree does the constitutional ban on
discrimination authorize legislation providing for "reverse discrimination"
25
or "benign quotas"?
The amendment may actually decrease the existing scope of
congressional authority. If the phrase "within their respective
jurisdictions" is to have any meaning, its effect may be to prohibit
congressional interference with matters traditionally left to the states,
such as family and domestic relations laws, although currently expanded
notions of what Congress may do to regulate interstate commerce and
enforce the requirements of equal protection would presently permit
federal intervention. Once again, the amendment's legislative history is
most unhelpful.

III. CONCLUSIONS
As a step towards full equality of men and women in this society, the
proposed "equal rights" amendment covers very little ground. The area of
governmentally compelled or sanctioned discrimination against women is
very limited and constantly diminishing. 2 6 Some of the primary planks of
the "women's liberation" platform, such as the right to abortion, or to
"child care centers," would be totally unaffected by the proposal even in
its "unisex" version. Nor is it possible to measure in advance how far even
this limited amount of progress will extend, as the conflict between the
two disparate objectives of women's rights remains unresolved. The debate
over the adoption of the amendment is seriously hampered by its
supporters' indecisiveness about its effects and duplicity about its
meaning.
If, however, an amendment is to be proposed by Congress, its aims and
purposes should be clearly delineated in the legislative history by answers
to the questions raised herein. Congress should particularly indicate
whether it is fostering a "unisex" approach or one that bars only invidious
discrimination against women. My preference is for the latter, which can
be accomplished by adding Senator Hayden's language to the present
proposal or by shifting its substantive provision to read: "Neither the
25

See P.B. Kurland, supra note 16, at 157-60.
See generally President's Commission on the Status of Women, AMERICAN
WOMEN (1963); U.S. Women's Bureau, Dept. of Labor, STATUS OF WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1952, at 9-10; Inter-American Commission on Women, A
COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF MEN AND WOMEN
IN THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. No. 270, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
26
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United States nor any State shall make any law that [discriminates
against] [imposes disabilities on] women because of their sex."
Better still would be legislation, effectively administered, directed to
specific evils in lieu of a broadly directed amendment. Congress and the
states already possess sufficient power to alleviate much of the very real
discriminations now suffered by women in American society. The "equal
rights" amendment would add little, if any, to this power. A protracted
struggle for its adoption, however, could spend the public energies needed
to effect the exercise of this power. Only martyrs enjoy Pyrrhic victories.
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